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TiRE are few subjects in the law which seem to be less thoroughly understood and which have in consequence given rise to
more conflicting decisions than that which stands at the head of
this article. In nearly every case which has arisen the opinion of
the judge has been exclusively shaped by the peculiar facts before.
him; instead of deducing the result from a comprehensive survey
of the whole field, the judicial mind has restricted itself to the
narrow limits set by the facts immediately before it, and a strange
confusion of ideas, sometimes in the succeeding decisions of thesame judge, has been the natural and necessary consequence.
The best definition of good-will is that of Mr. Justice STORY.
"Good-will," says he, "may be properly enough described -tobe
the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage
and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual
customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity,
or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other
accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." (Story on Partnership, § 99.) Lord
ELDON'S oft-repeated definition of good-will ((CJuttuwell v. Lye, 17'
Ves. 335) is far too narrow: "The good-will * * is nothing more.
VoL. XXIII.-1
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than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old
place." In Churton v. Douglas, Johnson's Oh. Rep. 174, V. C.
Sir W. PAGE WOOD uses the following language: "It was argued
that, in ,Shakle v. Baker, 14 Vesey 468, Cruttwell v. Lye,
17 Id. 335, and Yennedy v. Lee, 3 Meri. 452, lord ELDON has
laid down the principle, that an assignment of the 'good-will'
of a trade, simpliciter, carries no more with it than the ad-

vantage of occupying the premises which were occupied by the
former firm, and the chance you thereby have of the customers
of the former firm being attracted to those premises. - But it would
be taki,,g too narrow a view of what is thpre laid down by Lord
ELDON to say that it is confined to that. 'Itood-will,' I apprehend, must mean every advantage-every positive advantage, if I
may so express it, as contrasted with the negative advantage of the
late partner not carrying on the business himself-that has been
acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously
carried on, or with the name of the late firm, or with any other
matter carrying with it the benefit of the business. When Lord
ELDON is speaking of a nursery garden or a.locality which the
customers must frequent to look at the flowers and other things,
and when Sir THOMAS PLUMER, in another case, in speaking of a
retail shop which a person must enter in order to buy the goods
there exposed-they are only, as it appears to me, giving those as
illustrations of' what good-will is. But it would be absurd to say
'that, where a large wholesale business is conducted, the public are
.mindful whether it is carried on at one end of the Strand or the
other, or in Fleet street, or in the Strand or any place adjoining,
"and that they regard that, and do not regard the identity of the
-house of business-namely, the firm."
So in Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84, the Master of
'the Rolls, Sir JOHN ROMiLLY, says: "There is considerable difficulty in defining accurately what is included under this term
'good-will ;' it seems to be that species of connection in trade
which induces customers to deal with a particular firm. It varies
almost in every case, but it is a matter distinctly appreciable which
-can be preserved (at least to some .extent) if the business be sold
as a going concern, but which is wholly lost if the concern is
"wound up, its liabilities discharged and its assets got in and dis-tributed."
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At one time before clear notions as to the full .ature of goodwill had attained the ascendant, this idea that it was purely local
seems to have been firmly rooted. Whatever may have been Lord
*ELDOrN's opinions, his loose expression in aruttwell v. Lye was
closely followed both in England and America. In Chissum v.
.Dewes, 5 Russ. 29, the unexpired term in a house and the goodwill of a business established in it were sold in a creditor's suit,
with the consent of a creditor of the lessee with whom the lease
had been deposited as a security, and brought a less sum than the
amount of the debt: Sir JOHN LEACH, Al. R., said: "The goodwill of the business is nothing more than an advantage attached to
the possession of the house, and the mortgagee, being entitled to
the possession of the house, is entitled to the whole of that advantage. I cannot separate the good-will from the lease." The
whole of the proceeds of the sale was ordered to be paid into
court.' So in -Dougherty v. Iran .Nostrand, 1 Htoff. 68, it was
held that the good-will attached to the lease of premises formerly
occupied by partners, and that the value of the lease was enhanced by the good-will, which, it seems, Ass't. V. C. HIOFFMAN
considered to be inseparably attached thereto. So in Williams v.
Wilson, 4 Sand. Oh. 379, the Vice-Chancellor ordered the receiver
to sell the lease of premises occupied by partners between whom
difficulties had broken out, together with the good-will, &c. In
Elliott's App., 10 P. F. Smith 161, READ; J., says that "the
good-will of an inn or tavern is local, and does not exist independently of the house in which it is kept."
Perhaps the earliest example of good-will in the books is to be
found in Gibblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 460 (17 George II.). The question was whether some shares of the profits of a newspaper subsequent to the testator's death were part of the said testator's
personal estate. Lord HARDWICKE decided in the affirmative.
"This has been resembled to the case of a shoemalker, arid in that
case, suppose the dealing has been extensive and carried on in
partnership and with the father's stock, the son, who is executor,
would be accountable. Suppose the house was a house of great
I Doubtless all that the Mlaster of Rolls meant to decide in the foregoing case
was that the mortgagee had a lien upon the good-will as well as upon the lease,
or, in other words, that the lessee had made an equitable mortgage of both. Too
general language is always liable to be misunderstood, and it will be seen that in

New York the language of this decision was literally followed.
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trade, he must account for the value of what is called the good-will
of it." Defendant was accordingly charged with the profits from
testator's death. Attention to this decision in later cases would
have corrected the errQneous idea that good-will was necessatily and
in all cases local, an idea which, as we have seen, prevailed for no
inconsiderable time.
This cae practically decided that the name of a literary production was valuable and constituted part of the good-will. For,
as was said by the Master of the Rolls, in Bradbury v. Dickens,
2T Beav. 53, "the property in a literary periodical like this is
confined purely to the mere title, and the title of this work is
'Household Words,' and that forms part of the partnership
assets, and must be sold for the benefit of the partners, if it be of
any value." This principle of the value of the mere name of a
newspaper or periodical has been frequently recognised. See
Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Yes. 215; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige Ch. 75; iolden's Adm. v. Mcfakin, 1 Pars. Eq. 270.
Thus far we have considered the question of good-will principally as affecting but a single person. But the cas~s occur most
frequently on disputes between partners. It has frequently been
held that the firm name constitutes part of the good-will belonging
to the partnership. In Churton v. Douglas, Johns. Ch. R. 174, the
Vice-Chancellor says: "The name of a firm is a very important
part of the good-will of the business carried on by the firm. A
person says, I have'always bought good articles at such a house
of business; I know it by that name, and I send to the house of
business identified by that name for that purpose. There are cases
every day in this court with regard to the use of the name of a
particular firm, connected generally, no doubt, with the question
of trade-mark. But the question of trade-mark is in fact the
same question. The firm stamps its name upon the articles. It
stamps the name of the firm which is carrying on the business on
each article as a proof that they emanate from that firm; and it
becomes the known firm to which applications are made, just as
much as when a man enters a shop in a particular locality. And
when you are parting with the good-will of a business, you mean
to part with all that good disposition which customers entertain
towards the house of business identified by the particular name or
firm, and which may induce them to continue giving their custom
to it. * * That the name is an important part of the good-will of
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a business is obvious, when we consider that there are 'at this
moment large banking firms, and brewing firms, and others, in
this metropolis which do not contain a single member of the individul name exposed in the firm."
Accordingly where the defendant Jo/hn Doulas, formerly a member of the firm of John
Douglas J- Co., bad sold all his share in the "good-will" of the
partnership to plaintiffs, who were his former partners, he was restrained from using the firm name of Jotn Douglass & Co.,
although his own name was John Douglass and lie was associated
with others in partnership, and the Vice-Chancellor went on to
say that if the ol firm name had been merely "John Douglas,"
and there had been a sale by an individual of that name of all his
share in the good-will of the firm, and "that he bad secured the
three managing men in the former business, and was going, as here,
to set up the old firm of ' John Douglas' with these three men, I
should hold then, as I hold now, that he was not at liberty to
trade under such misrepresentation."
The same principle was held in Rodgers v. Nowill, 3 De G., M.
& G. 614, and 6 Hare 325. Joseph Rodgers & Co. obtained an
injunction against John & William Nowill and JWilliam Rogers
from stamping the name or mark " ". Rodgers & Sons," with a
crown and the royal initials, upon articles of cutlery. Soon after
this, 7I' Rodgers entered into partnership ith his father, John P.,and with a brother, and the three then began again to use the forbidden trade-mark, "J. -RodgersJ- Sons," together with the crown
and the royal initials, and an unimportant addition thereto. Upon
the plaintiffs moving to commit 71..Rodgers, they were held entitled to the order, although the designation of '" J. Rodgers g
Sons" accurately described defendants' firm.
The case of a firm name assimilates this branch of good-will so
nearly to trade-marks that it can hardly be doubted that the same
principles are applicable alike to both. While, therefore, the
limits of an article must preclude us from venturing upon the
broad subject of trade-marks, it may not be out of place to inquire
what are the general principles governing this species of property.
It was formerly thought that the sole preventive jurigdiction of
a Court of Equity in regard to the improper use of a trade-mark
or a firm name, or any symbol which indicated that the goods to
which it was affixed was the work of a particular firm, was founded
on fraud and deceit. But it was decided in an early case (M3Iil-
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lington v. Foy, 3 Myl. & Or. 338) that a perpetual injunction
would be granted against the use by one tradesman of the trademarks of another, although those marks had been so used bond
fide, in ignorance of their being any person's propt.rty and under
the belief that they were merely technical terms. Lord COTTEN,u.Am, Chancellor, said that he had "come to the conclusion that
there was sufficient in the case to show that the plhaitiffs had a
title to the marks in question, and they undoubtedly had a right to'
the assistance of a court of equity to enforce that title. At the
same time, the case is very different from the cases of this kind
which usually occur where there has been a fraudulent use by one
person of the trade-mark or names used by another trader."
Perpetual injunction was granted. This case was decided in 1838,
and was followed in 1864 by Hall v. Barrows, 33 L. J. Ch. 204.
This is the most masterly exposition of the whole subject to be met
with in the reports, and the reader will therefore pardon a very
full citation from the opinion of Lord WESTBURY, who was then
Chancellor.
"But it must be borne in mind that a name, although originally
the name" of the first maker, may in time become a mere trademark or sign of quality and cease to denote, or to be current as indicating, that any particular person is the maker. In many cases
a name once affixed to a manufactured article continues to be used
for generations after the death of the individual who first affixed
it. In such cases the name is either accepted in the market, as a
brand of quality, or it becomes the denomination of the commodity
itself, and is no longer a representation that the article is the manufacture of any particular person. The case of Millington v. Poy,
3 Myl. & Or. 338, * * * is very important as establishing the
principle that the jurisdictionof this court in the protection of trademarks rests on property, and that fraud in the defendant is not
necessaryfor the exercise of that jurisdiction."
"This distinction between a name and a trade-mark' must be
observed. It may be true that if a name impressed upon a vendible commodity passes current in the market, not as an indiciun
of quality; but simply as a statement or assurance that the commodity has been manufactured by a particular person, the court
would not sell and transfer to another person the right to use
the name simply and without addition; but if the court sold the
business or manufacture-carried on by the owner of the name, it
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would give to the purchaser the right to represent himself as the
successor in business of the first maker, and in that character to
use the name."
"The remaining question relates to the good-will of the business.
I agree that the good-will. ought to be included in any sale or
valuation as a distinct subject of value, but I think it necessary
that the direction to value the good-will should be accompanied by
a declaration defining what is meant by the"good-will," * * that
is'to say, a declaration that the good-will is to be valued upon the
principle that the surviving partner, if he be not the purchaser.
shall not be restrained from setting up the same description of business. No such restriction could be placed on the surviving partner if the sale were made to a stranger, but, even without any such
restriction, there may be a subject of value denoted by the term
' good-will,' that ought to be taken into account in making the
valuation.
"* * Inasmuch as the defendant, the surviving partner
has by
his counsel submitted and agreed to accept and take all the stock
belonging to the partnership, according to the construction which
the court shall put upon the word , stock,' * * I declare that the
words 'stock belonging to the partnership,' include aidi de: ote
the partnership business, * * * also that the exclusive right to
use the trade-mark of the partnership is part of the property of the
partnership and ought to be included in the valuation ; and that
the good-will of the business of the partnership ought also to be
valued, and that the same is to be valued on the footing of the surviving partner being at liberty to set up and carry on the same
business as the partnership."
This same view had been already entertained by Lord Chancellor CRANIWOITH (1856), in the case of .Fiarinav. Silverlock, 6 De
G., M. & G. 214, and to the same effect, see 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1648,
and Partridgev. Mench et al., 2 Barb. Oh. 101, where Chancellor
WALWORT11 says "*
*
the court proceeds upon the ground that
the complainant has a valuable interest in the good-will of his
trade or business ; and that having appropriated to himself a particular label or sign, or trade-mark indicating to them who wish to
give him their patronage that the article is manufactured or sold by
him, or by his authority, or that he carries on his business at a particular place, he is entitled to protection against any other person
who attempts to pirate upon the good-will of the complainant's

.
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friends or customers, or of the patrons of his trade or business, by
sailing under his flag without his authority and consent."
The term 'good-will' has been sometimes applied to another case,
"4where a retiring partner contracts not to carry on the same trade
or business at all, or not within a given distance. This is an interest, which may be valued between the parties and may therefore
be *assigned with the premises and the rest of the effects to the
remaining partner as anx accompaniment of the ordinary good-will
of the establishment. Good-will in the former sense is therefore
an advantage arising from the mere fact of sole ownership of
the premises, stock, or establishment, without reference to other
persons, as rivals; and in the latter sense, as an advantage arising from the fact of excluding the retiring partner from the same
trade or business, as a rival:" Story on Partnership, § 99. So in
Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 440, Lord ELDON says "there is another
way in which the good-will of a trade may be rendered still more
valuable ; as by certain stipulations entered into between the parties at the time of the one relinquishing his share in the business, as by inserting a condition that the withdrawing partner shall
not carry on the same trade any longer, or that he shall not carry
it on within a certain distance of the place where the partnership
trade was carried on, and where the continuing partner is to carry
it on upon his own sole and separate account."
It is unfortunate
that the loose illustration made by so gieat a man as Lord ELDON,
understood with literal accuracy by Judge STORY, should have been
preserved to confuse the student in a subject already not free from
difficulty. Go'od-will, as we have tried to show, is a species of incorporeal personalty, and, as we shall show shortly, subject with but
few exceptions to the general laws which regulate that kind of property. But what Lord ELDON speaks of is nothing more than the
advantage derived and derivable from a contract, which may or
may not last beyond the life of the person contractitig according
to the terms of tme stipulation. To call this advantige good-will
is to confuse by the use of popular language the exact and scientific definition of a spceie. of property, the nature of which is only
beginning to be understood, and of which, therefore, it is extremely
important to keep the outlines clearly in view. We shall presently see wha a variety of decisions has been occasioned by the
apparent ignorance of the judge of what good-will was exactly, as
we have already seen the change which has ensued regarding the
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principle of equitable relief from that of fraud upon the .public to
that of property in the owner of a trade-mark or good-will.
It has been said that "good-will" has no application to the
learned professions. Thus in Austen v. Boys, 2 De G. & J. 626,
(1858), Lord CHELMSFORD .says: " * * * It is very difficult to
give any intelligible meaning to the term 'good-will,' as applied
to the professional practice of a solicitor. * * * Where a trade
is.established in a particular place, the good-will of that trade means
nothing more than the sum of money which any person would be
willing to give for the chance of being able to keep the trade connected with the place where it has'been carried on. * * The
term ' good-will' seems wholly inapplicable to the business of a
solicitor, which had no local existence, but is entirely personal,
depending upon the trust and confidence which persons may repose
in his integrity and ability to conduct their legal affairs; * * *
to sell the good-will without any thing more, and without arranging
any price, would be an agreement incapable of being enforced by
specific performance." There is certainly no good reason why
good-will should not exist in a firm of solicitors, and it has been
well said (3d ed. of Bythewood's Precedents, vol. ix., note to
form 102), "In this view of the case, it will be apparent that
the distinction which has been taken between a sale of a trade and
of a profession is unsound. A customer who resorts to a particular trader, because he believes him to be a fair dealer, has as
much ground of complaint if the person is secretly changed as
the customer of a professional man, relying on his skill, would
have under similar circumstances." In England the sale of the
practice of a country physician and of the business connection of
a.firm of solicitors, with covenant to withdraw entirely or partially
from practice, is of fi'equent recurrence, and in this country where
partnerships are so common among lawyers, large sums have been
offered to an old and well-known firm for the admission of an additional partner. Thus a firm may be gradually changed so that
in a few years there shall not be a single one of the old members
remaining. Now all that portion of the prodeds of the business
above that which the new partners would have received if they had
originally associated themselves together under their own name
and carried their business on in a different place, must be attributel to the good-will of the old partnership, although it must be
VOL. XXIII.-2
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allowed that this species of property is much less likely to exist
among professional than among business men.
In Parr v. Pearce, 3 Mad. 74, Vice-Chancellor LEACH held
that, where F. had paid a premium and entered into partnership
with P., a surgeon, and F. died and P. sold the good-will of the
trade, the representative of F. was not entitled to a share of the
money for which such good-will was sold. This was decided on
the ground that the articles of agreement defined the interest
which the representatives of the deceased partner were to take, and
that as the good-will was not mentioned it must be held to have
been the intention of the parties that it should vest inthe survivor. But he went on to say, that "if the general question
had arisen here, I think it would have been difficult to maintain
that where a partnership is formed between professional persons,
as surgeons, and one dies, the other is obliged to give up his business and sell the connection for the joint benefit of himself and
the estate of his deceased partner. When such partnerships determine, unless there be stipulations to the contrary, each must be
at liberty to continue his own exertions, and where the determination is by.the death of one, the right of the survivor cannot
be affected. Such partnerships are very different from commercial
partnerships, &c."
This attempted distinction between commercial and professional
partnerships is as we have seen untenable; nor does the reasoning
adopted by the Vice-Chancellor sustain the conclusion at which he
arrives. Let it be once granted that good-will can exist in a profession (and such a fact is conceivable, though the value of the
good-will be immeasurably smaller in such a case than in a trade),
and the conclusion at once is that on a dissolution of the partnership all the partners are entitled to share the proceeds of what is
one of the assets of the firm. It is no answer to this to say that
because neither partner can be prevented from continuing the business on his own account, and because the value of the connection
or good-will may be utterly destroyed, the principle ceases to exist.
What is true of a profession is on principle true of a business ; no
sound distinction can be perceived between them.
We have seen that in England the name of a firm is held to he a
part of the good-will and an asset of the partnership. In Howe
v. Searing, 19 How.Pr. R. 14, a different view was taken by Ass't.
V. C. HOFFMAN, and it was held that a sale of the good-will of a
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business not only did not confer on the vendee a right- to use the
name of the vendor, but that the vendor in the absence of a covenant not to trade might set up a business precisely similar to the
one sold, and might continue to use the name by which the old
business had become known and valuable. This decision was concurred in by Judge ROBINSON, but Judge MONCRIFF dissented
from it. It is unnecessary to criticise a decision which runs
counter to all the cases. Suffice it to say that it rests on a ground
which in England has been considered perfectly untenable, viz.:
that a business carried on under the name of an individual or individuals who have ceased all connection with the firm (either by
death or otherwise) is an imposition upon the public, and will not
be protected in equity. The view held on this subject in England
is clearly set forth in the citations from Hall v. Barrows and Churton v. -Douglass,supra. The point does not seem to have been
raised in this country except in the case of Rowe v. Searing, just
quoted, but it can hardly be doubted that when the case arises
again it will be decided in conformity with the English authorities.
That the name of a firm is part of the good-will has been recognised also in Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421, and Banks v. Gibson,
11 Jur. Pt. 1, 680, where Sir JOHN ROMILLY, M. R., says: "The
name or style of the firm, Banks & Co., was an asset of the partnership, and if the whole concern and the whole good-will had been
sold, this was a trade-mark or asset which might have been sold
with it." So in Johnson v. Helleley, 34 Beav. 63, the right to the
purchaser "to hold himself out as the successor of the firm of
Samuel Johnson J- Sons," was sold with the business of the firm.
On the general proposition that the good-will of a firm is one of
the partnership assets and valuable, see M31acdonald v. Richardson
and Richardson v. Marten, 1 Gif. 81; Banks v. Gibson, 11 Jur.
Pt. 1, 680; Johnson v. Helleley, 34 Beav. 63; Williams v. Wilson,
4 Sand. Oh. 379; Alellersh v. Keen, 28 Beav. 453: Bradbury v.
Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Aitstin v. Boys, 2 De Gex & Jones 626;
Turner v. Mfajor, 3 Gif. 442; Wedderburn v. T'edderburn, 22
Beav. 84, Willett v. Blandford, 1 Hare 271; IHolden v. Ml.flaie.arlan v. Stewart, 2 Watts 111;
kin, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 270;
Alusselman's App., 6 P. F. Smith 81 ; Dougherty-v. TVan _Nrostrand,
1 Hoff. 68 ; Case v. Abed, 1 Paige 401 ; lMarten v. Fan Schaick,
A. S. BIDDLE.
4 Paige 479.
(To be cotinued.)

